Volume 41 Issue 2
Apr.  2023
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LIU Yi, BU Xinru. Modeling and Analysis of the Effects of Government Incentives onto Reduction of Ship Carbon Emission Based on an Improved Principal-agent Model[J]. Journal of Transport Information and Safety, 2023, 41(2): 147-156. doi: 10.3963/j.jssn.1674-4861.2023.02.016
Citation: LIU Yi, BU Xinru. Modeling and Analysis of the Effects of Government Incentives onto Reduction of Ship Carbon Emission Based on an Improved Principal-agent Model[J]. Journal of Transport Information and Safety, 2023, 41(2): 147-156. doi: 10.3963/j.jssn.1674-4861.2023.02.016
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Modeling and Analysis of the Effects of Government Incentives onto Reduction of Ship Carbon Emission Based on an Improved Principal-agent Model

doi: 10.3963/j.jssn.1674-4861.2023.02.016
  • 1.

    School of Navigation, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430063, China

  • 2.

    Hubei Key Laboratory of Inland Shipping Technology, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430063, China

  • 3.

    National Engineering Research Center for Water Transport Safety, Wuhan University of Technology, Wuhan 430063, China

  • Received Date: 2022-07-30
    Available Online: 2023-06-19
    Abstract
  • Currently, the incentives for carbon emission reduction mainly focus on carbon pricing, carbon taxes, and reduction of ship speed, while there is no subsidy incentives for shipping companies implementing carbon reduction measures. Due to the differences in operational modes, emission reduction strategies, and asset compositions between shipping companies and ordinary enterprises, the assumptions of traditional principal-agent model fail to meet the need to analyze the effect of government incentive onto the shipping industry. Therefore, specific improvements to the existing principalagent models are required. The purpose is to achieve the maximum social benefit with limited government funds, while the shipping companies that make best efforts will receive maximum profits. Considering the exogenous uncertainty of the effect of policies onto carbon reduction for risk-averse shipping companies, a government incentive model for the reduction of ship carbon emission is proposed. Since the government cannot always fully observe the efforts of a shipping company for reducing emissions, the scenarios with complete and incomplete information are independently analyzed. Setting the optimization objectives separately for the government and the shipping companies to maximize their own benefit, the optimal reward-penalty coefficient for the government and the optimal level of efforts for reducing carbon emission from the shipping companies are found. The optimal incentive contract is also studied for the government to regulate the shipping companies. The parameters for internal and external factors determining the efforts for reducing carbon emission by the shipping companies are discussed, as well as their impacts on the optimal incentives provided by the government and the relevant parameters. Study results show that the optimal incentive coefficient decreases at a decreasing rate when the variance of exogenous random variable and the absolute risk aversion coefficient increase. When the variance is 8 and the risk aversion coefficient is 4, the rate of decrease stabilizes. At this point, the shipping companies exhibit a strong aversion to the risks of reducing carbon emission and a strong resistance to implementing the measures. The cost coefficient and the coefficient influencing the level of efforts for reducing emissions jointly affect the intensity of the companies to implement measures. When the level of efforts is high, the government incentives initially increase quickly and then level off as the cost for the shipping companies increase. This implies that the government aims to meet the needs of reducing carbon emission of the shipping companies within its limited funds to reduce difficulties within the implementation. However, once the incentives reach a certain level, further increase in incentive will not directly affect the motivation of shipping companies to reduce emissions. Due to the joint impact of the cost coefficient and the coefficient of the level of effort for emission reduction on the government incentives, there will be one optimal incentive under different shipping market conditions. Considering the development of shipping industry along the Yangtze River, when the cost coefficient is 0.5 and the coefficient of the level of effort for emission reduction is 3, the optimal impact of government incentive is achieved.

     

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